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Abstract
We study linear productionsituationswith an inﬁnitenumber of productiontechniques. Such
a situation gives rise to a semi-inﬁnite linear program. Related to this program, we introduce
primal and dual games and study relationsbetween these games, the cores of these games and the
so-called Owen set.
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1 Introduction
Linear production(LP) situationsare situationswhere several producers own resource bundles. They
canuse theseresourcestoproducevariousproductsvia linearproductiontechniquesthatare available
to all the producers. The goal of each producer is to maximize his proﬁt, which equals the revenue
of his products at the given market prices. These situations and corresponding cooperative games
are introduced in Owen (1975). He showed that these games have a nonempty core by constructing
a core-element via a related dual linear program. Samet and Zemel (1984) study relations between
the set of all core-elements we can ﬁnd in this way and the core, and the emphasis in their study is
placed on replication of players. Gellekom, Potters, Reijnierse, Tijs and Engel (2000) named the set
of all the core-elements that can be found in the same way as Owen did, the ‘Owen set’ and they
give a characterization of this set. More general are situations involving the linear transformation of
products(LTP),introducedbyTimmer, BormandSuijs(2000),wheredifferentproducersmay control
different transformationtechniquesand each of thesetechniquescan have more than oneoutputgood.
LTP situationsgive rise to LTP games, which also have a nonempty core.
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1A part of Fragnelli, Patrone, Sideri and Tijs (1999) is devoted to the study of semi-inﬁnite LP
situations. These are LP situationswhere there is a countablyinﬁnite number of products that can be
produced. Semi-inﬁniteLTPsituations,inwhichthereisacountablyinﬁnitenumberoftransformation
techniques, are analyzed in Timmer, Llorca and Tijs (2000).
In this work we study relations between the Owen set and the core of semi-inﬁnite LP and LTP
situations. For this reason, we introduceprimal and dual games correspondingto the primal and dual
programsofbothsemi-inﬁniteLP andLTPsituations. Relationsbetweentheseprimalanddualgames
are analyzed. Our main result is that for both semi-inﬁnite LP and LTP situations the core of the
corresponding game is nonempty if there exists a ﬁnite upper bound for the maximal proﬁt obtained
by the coalition of all producers.
This work is organized as follows. The sections 2 and 4 present the most relevant results of
respectively ﬁnite LP and LTP situations and their corresponding games. Semi-inﬁnite LP and LTP
situations are introduced in the sections 3 and 5, respectively. Relations between the Owen set, the
core and the primal and dual games are investigated and we show that the core is nonempty if there
exists a ﬁnite upper bound for the maximal proﬁt obtained by the coalition of all producers. Section
6 concludes.
2 Finite linear production situations
Finite linear production (LP) situations describe situations with a set of producers, a bundle of
resources for each producerand a set oflinear productiontechniquesthat all theproducers may apply.
The resources are used in the various linear production techniques to produce some products that
can be sold on the market at given market prices. We assume that there are no costs involved. The
goal of each producer is to maximize his proﬁts. Producers are also allowed to cooperate and pool
their resources. Such a coalition of producers also maximizes its proﬁt given the joint resources.
Cooperation pays off because the maximal proﬁt of the group is at least as much as the sum of the
individualproﬁts.
More formally, denote by N, R and Q respectively the ﬁnite sets of producers, resources and
products. The technology matrix A 2 IR
R  Q
+ describes all the available linear production techniques
in the following way. Each production technique produces one product and you need Aij units of
resource i 2 R to produce one unit of product j 2 Q. The resources owned by the producers are
described by the resource matrix B 2 IR R  N
+ where producer k 2 N owns Bik units of resource
i 2 R. Prices are denoted by the price vector c 2 IR
Q
+ nf 0 g . We assume that there is a positive
quantity available of each resource, that is, for all resources i 2 R there is a producer k such that
Bik > 0. Furthermore, if there is a product j with a positive market price, then we do not allow for
“output without input” and therefore there exists at least one resource i 2 R with Aij > 0. Finally,
all producers are price-takers and all products can be sold on the market.
To maximize his proﬁt, producer k needs an optimal production plan x 2 IR
Q
+ that tells him how
much he should produce of each good. Not all production plans are feasible since the producer has
2to take into account his limited amount of resources. The amount of resources needed in production
plan x, Ax, should not exceed the amount of resources of producer k, Befkg,w h e r ee f k gdenotes the
kth unit vector in I RN with efkg;t =1if t = k and efkg;t =0otherwise. Furthermore, the production
plan has to be nonnegative since we are only interested in producing nonnegative quantities of the








Next to producing on their own, producers are allowed to cooperate. If a coalition S of producers
cooperatesthentheyputalltheirresourcestogetherand so,thiscoalitionhastheresource bundleBeS
at its disposal, where eS 2 IR N with eS;t =1if t 2 S and eS;t =0if t= 2S . Given this large amount
of resources, the coalition wants to maximize its proﬁt,
PS :m a x
n
x T c j Ax  BeS;x0
o
;
where PS denotesthe primallinear program for coalitionS. The correspondingdualproblem for this
coalition,DS, is the followingprogram.





ATy  c; y  0
o
The vector y can be seen as a vector of shadow prices for the resources since the condition ATy  c
can be interpreted as follows. If a company wants to buy the resources BeS of coalition S and is
willing to pay yj per unit of good j 2 M then for any product j 2 Q, the value of the resources
needed to produce one unit of this product according to the prices in y should be at least as large as
the market price cj. Otherwise, coalition S will not agree with this sale. Therefore, the program DS
minimizesthevalueof the resourcesownedbycoalitionS according to theshadow prices and subject
to the restrictions above.
For ease of notation,letFpS and FdS denotethesetof feasiblesolutionsof respectivelythe primal
and dual program for coalitionS,
FpS =
n





y 2 IR R

 A T y  c; y  0
o
;
denote by wpS and wdS the optimal values of the programs,
wpS =m a x
n
x T c j x 2 F pS
o
;
wdS =m i n
n
y T BeS jy 2 FdS
o
;

















The assumptions we made ensure that FpS, FdS, OpS and OdS are nonempty sets and wpS and wdS
exist and are ﬁnite. It follows from dualitytheory that wpS = wdS for all coalitionsS.
3We see that an LP situation can be described by the tuple (N;A;B;c). Corresponding to such
a situation we deﬁne two games, (N;vp) and (N;vd). The ﬁrst one, (N;vp), is the well known LP
game where vp(S)=w pS for all coalitionsS. The second game, (N;vd), is the game that gives each
coalitionS the value of its dual program, vd(S)=w dS.
If two producers cooperate then they can produce at least the amount that they can produce on
their own, so, their joint proﬁt will be at least as large as the sum of their individual proﬁts. Similar
reasoning shows that the highest proﬁt will be obtained if all the producers work together. But how
should this joint proﬁt be divided among the producers? We could divide the proﬁt according to a
so-called core-allocation.T h ecore of a game (N;v),C(v), allocates the proﬁt in such a way that no











x i = v ( N ) ;
X
i 2 S
x i  v ( S ) for all S  N
)
:
We deﬁne the core of an LP situation, Core(A;B;c), to be the core of the corresponding LP game,
Core(A;B;c)=C ( v p) . Owen (1975) shows that LP games are totally balanced, that is, the games
themselves have a nonempty core and so do all of their subgames. He obtains this result by showing
that we can easily obtain a core-element of an LP game as follows. Instead of solving the programs
PS for all coalitions S  N in order to calculate vp(S) and the core, we only solve DN, the dual
program of the grand coalition. Let y be an optimal solution of DN. If each producer k gets the
value of his resources according to the shadow prices, yTBefkg, then this distribution of values is a
core-allocation. The set of all core-allocations that we can obtain in this way, is called the Owen set
correspondingto the LP situation (N;A;B;c).
Owen(A;B;c)=
n
( y TBefkg)k2N j y 2 OdN
o
ThissethasbeenstudiedextensivelybyGellekometal.(2000)andtheyalsoprovideacharacterization
of the Owen set. Because the set OdN is nonempty, so is Owen(A;B;c). Furthermore, each vector
in this set is an element of C(vp) and therefore Owen(A;B;c)  Core(A;B;c).
We end this section with an example of an LP situationand corresponding LP game.
Example 2.1 Consider the following LP situation. There are two producers, N = f1;2g,t w o

















Producer 1 owns nothing of the second resource (see the ﬁrst column of the resource matrix B)
and producer 2 owns nothing of the ﬁrst resource. Since both products require a positive amount
of input of each of the two resources, a single producer cannot produce anything. Consequently,
vp(f1g)=v p ( f 2 g )=0 . If both producers cooperate then they own a positive amount of each
resource and they have many productionplans at their disposal,namely all plans x 2 FpN.
FpN = fx 2 IR 2 j 2 x 1 +2 x 26 ;x 1+3 x 27 ;x0 g
4TheproﬁtofsuchaproductionplanxiscTx =3 x 1+4x2andso,theproﬁtmaximizationproblemPN
of the grand coalition equals maxf3x1 +4 x 2jx2F pNg. The maximal proﬁt wpN =1 1is attained
in the plan x =( 1 ; 2)T,s oO pN = f(1;2)Tg,a n dC o r e ( A;B;c)=f ( a;11 − a)Tj0  a  11g.
For the dual game (N;vd) it holds that vd(fig)=v p( f i g )=0for all i 2 N. The set of all feasible
shadow prices for the grand coalitionis the set
FdN = fy 2 IR 2j 2 y 1 + y 2  3 ; 2 y 1 +3 y 24 ;y0 g :
We want to minimize the value of the resources of coalition N according to the shadow prices
y, yTBeN =6 y 1+7 y 2, over all feasible shadow prices: minf6y1 +7 y 2jy2F dNg. The min-
imum wdN =1 1is attained in y =( 5 = 4 ; 1 = 2)T and so OdN = f(5=4;1=2)Tg. The Owen
set, Owen(A;B;c)=f (15=2;7=2)Tg, consists of one point and we see that Owen(A;B;c) 
Core(A;B;c), Owen(A;B;c) 6= Core(A;B;c).
3
3 Semi-inﬁnite LP situations
If we extend the set Q such that it contains a countable inﬁnite number of products then we arrive
at semi-inﬁnite LP situations. Without loss of generality we may assume that Q = IN = f 1 ; 2 ;::: g,
the set of natural numbers. An example of a production process with a countable inﬁnite number of
products is the ‘process’ of baking pancakes at home. Pancakes are made of milk, ﬂour, eggs, salt,
butterand perhapsalittlesugar. If youhave arecipe for bakingpancakesandyouchangetheamounts
of the ingredients slightly (e.g. you add a little ﬂour or you use a little bit less milk) then you get
another recipe for pancakes. This set of processes will be countable inﬁnite if you require that all
quantitiesshouldbe integer multiplesof one gram, for example.
A semi-inﬁnite LP situation (N;A;B;c) thus has A 2 IR
R  Q
+ , B 2 IR R  N
+ and c 2 IR
Q
+ with
Q = I N. As opposed to LP situations, we impose no further restrictions on these variables. Because
we have a countableinﬁnitenumber of products,the linearprograms, whichdetermine the ‘maximal’
proﬁts of the coalitions, and their dual programs are now semi-inﬁnite linear programs. The primal
program for a coalition S of producers that determines its maximal proﬁt, now equals
PS :s u p f x T c j Ax  BeS;x0 g ;
where wereplaced the maximum by the supremumsince theoptimal valuemay not be reached by any
productionplan x. Thisprogram containsan inﬁnite number of variables xj, j 2 Q. Similarly, in the
dual program
DS :i n f f y T BeSjATy  c; y  0g
we replaced the minimum by the inﬁmum because we have an inﬁnite number of restrictions. The set
offeasibledualsolutions,FdS, may nowbeempty andthesameholdsfor thesetsof optimalsolutions
OpS and OdS. The optimal values are
wpS =s u p f x T c j x 2 F pSg
wdS =i n f f y T BeSjy 2 FdSg:
5Onceagainwedeﬁnetwogames,theLPgame(N;vp)andthedualgame(N;vd)wherevp(S)=w pS
andvd(S)=w dS. NoticethatinthissettingthevalueswpS andwdS maytakeanynonnegativenumber
including+1. Several nice properties of these games are mentioned in the next theorem.
Theorem 3.1 Let (N;A;B;c)be a semi-inﬁniteLP situation. Then
1. FdS = FdN for all S  N,
2. vp and vd are monotonicgames,
3. vp(S)  vd(S) for all S  N.
Proof. First, by deﬁnition it holds that FdS = fy 2 IR R j A T y  c; y  0g = FdN for all S  N.
Second, let S  T  N becoalitionsofagents, thena game (N;v)ismonotonicif v(S)  v(T).
Here, BeS  BeT implies that FpS  FpT and so vp(S) = supfxTcjx 2 FpSgv p ( T ) .F r o m
the ﬁrst part of this proof it follows that FdS = FdT and together with BeS  BeT this gives
vd(S)=i n ff y TBeSjy 2 FdSgv d( T) .
Third, let S  N be a coalition of agents. If FdS = ; then vp(S) 1=v d ( S ) .O t h e r w i s e ,
take feasible solutions x 2 FpS and y 2 FdS.T h e n x T c=c T xy T Ax  yTBeS and therefore
vp(S) = supfxTcjx 2 FpSginffyTBeSjy 2 FdSg = vd(S).
2
We use these propertiestoprove the next resultsaboutthe relationsbetweenthe Owen set and the
cores of the LP and dual games.
Theorem 3.2 Let (N;A;B;c)be a semi-inﬁniteLP situation. Then
1. Owen(A;B;c)  C(vd),
2. if vp(N)=v d( N)then C(vd)  C(vp).
Proof. Firstly, if Owen(A;B;c)=;then we are ﬁnished. Otherwise, take an element z 2
Owen(A;B;c). Then there exists an optimal dual solution y0 2 OdN such that zi =( y 0 ) TBefig for
all i 2 N.S o ,
P
i 2 Nz i=
P
i 2 N ( y 0 ) T Befig =( y 0 ) TBeN = vd(N) because y0 2 OdN.I t a l s o
holdsthat
P
i2S zi =( y 0) TBeS  inffyTBeSjy 2 FdSg = vd(S)where theinequalityfollowsfrom
y0 2 FdS. We conclude that z 2 C(vd).
Secondly, ifC(vd)=;then weare ﬁnished. Otherwisetakean element z 2 C(vd). Bydeﬁnition
it holds that
P
i2N zi = vd(N)=v p ( N ) . It also holds that
P
i2S zi  vd(S)  vp(S) where the
ﬁrst inequality follows from z 2 C(vd) and the second one from statement 3 in theorem 3.1. Hence,
z 2 C(vp).
2
Acorollaryofthistheoremisthatifvp(N)=v d( N) ,thereisnodualitygap,thenOwen(A;B;c) 
Core(A;B;c). In the ﬁrst part of the proof we noticed that Owen(A;B;c)=;may hold. The fol-
lowingexample providesa semi-inﬁniteLP situationwhere thisistrue and where thecores of the two
games are nonempty.
6Example 3.3 Consider the semi-inﬁnite LP situation(N;A;B;c)where N is a set of ﬁve agents,
A =
2
4 11::: 1 :::














vd(N)=i n f f y T BeNjATy  c; y  0g
=i n f f y 2 j y 1 + n 2 y 2  2 n; n =1 ;2 ;:::; y0g
=0 ;
F dN 6= ; but OdN = ;. Consequently, Owen(A;B;c)=; .H o w e v e r , v p ( N )=0implies that
vp(S)=0for all S  N and therefore Core(A;B;c)=C ( v p)=f (0;0;:::;0)g6 =; . Similarly we
can show that C(vd)=f (0;0;:::;0)g.
3
TwootherrelationsbetweentheOwensetandthecore,dependingonthevaluesvp(N)andvd(N),
are presented in the next theorem.
Theorem 3.4 Let (N;A;B;c)be a semi-inﬁniteLP situation. Then
1. if vp(N) <v d( N)<1then Owen(A;B;c) \ Core(A;B;c)=; ,
2. if vp(N) <v d( N)=1then Owen(A;B;c)=;and the core Core(A;B;c) is nonempty.
Proof. Concerning the ﬁrst item, if Owen(A;B;c)=;then the proof is ﬁnished. Otherwise, let
z 2 Owen(A;B;c) and take y 2 OdN such that zi = yTBefig for all i 2 N.T h e n
P
i 2 Nz i=
P
i 2 Ny T Befig = yTBeN = vd(N) >v p( N) . Hence, z= 2C ( v p )=Core(A;B;c).
Secondly, since BeN contains ﬁnite quantities, vd(N)=1can occur only if FdN = ;.I nt h i s
case, OdN = ; and therefore Owen(A;B;c)=; . The latter part of this statement, the nonemptiness
of Core(A;B;c), will be shownin theorem 3.6.
2
All the above relations between the Owen set and the core of a semi-inﬁnite LP situation can be
summarized as follows.
Theorem 3.5 Let (N;A;B;c)be a semi-inﬁniteLP situation.
 If vp(N)=v d( N)then Owen(A;B;c)  Core(A;B;c).
 If vp(N) <v d( N)then Owen(A;B;c)\ Core(A;B;c)=; .
Proof. The proof follows immediately from the theorems 3.2 and 3.4.
2
As we stated in the second part of the proof of theorem 3.4 there is one thingleft to show, namely
that the core of a semi-inﬁnite LP situation is nonempty whenever the ‘proﬁt’ of the grand coalition
is ﬁnite, vp(N) < 1.
7Theorem 3.6 Let (N;A;B;c) be a semi-inﬁnite LP situation where the corresponding LP game
(N;vp)has vp(N) < 1. Then Core(A;B;c) 6= ;.
Proof. This proof is an exhaustive list of all possible semi-inﬁnite LP situations that we may come
across. Ineach ofthesesituationswewillshowthatifvp(N)isﬁnitethenCore(A;B;c)isanonempty
set.
First, suppose that BeN =0 ,w h e r e0denotes the vector with each element equal to zero. Thus,
all the agents have no resources available. But then no producer can produce a positive quantity
of any product, so FpS = f0g for all coalitions S and consequently vp(S)=0 . In particular,
vp(N)=0<1and Core(A;B;c)=C( v p)=f (0;:::;0)g6 =; .
What happens if BeN 6=0but every product needs a resource that is not available? Let h(t)
describe for all resource vectors t 2 IR R
+ those resources that are available in a positive quantity, so,
h(t)=f i2R jt i>0 g . Denote by e0
j the jth unit vector in I RQ with e0
j;l =1if l = j and e0
j;l =0
otherwise. Then Ae0
j is a vector in I RR
+ that describes how much we need of each resource to produce
one unit of product j 2 Q. Thus, h(BeN) 6 h(Ae0
j) for all j 2 Q means that each product j 2 Q
needs some unavailable resources. Consequently, no producer can produce a positive quantity of
some product, FpS = f(0;0;::: )gand vp(S)=0for all coalitions S of producers. In particular,
vp(N)=0<1and Core(A;B;c)=f (0;:::;0)g6 =; .
AssumenowthatBeN 6=0andthatsomeproductscanbeproduced,thatis,h(BeN)  h(Ae0
j)for
some j 2 Q. All coalitionsof producers want to maximize their proﬁt and therefore they will restrict
theirproductiontotheproductsthatcanbeproduced. So,withoutchangingthevaluesofthecoalitions
we remove all products j 2 Q that cannot be produced, that is, for which h(BeN) 6 h(Ae0
j),a s
well as all unavailable resources i 2 R, which have (BeN)i =0 . For simplicity of notation, let
(N;A;B;c)also denote this reduced semi-inﬁnite LP situation.
This brings us to the next situation where BeN > 0 and consequently, h(BeN)=Mh ( Ae0
j)
for all j 2 Q. What happens if c =0 , prices are zero? If all products have a price equal to zero
then anything a producer sells on the market will give him a revenue of zero. So, vp(S)=0for all
coalitionsS of producers and in particular it holds that vp(N)=0<1and Core(A;B;c) 6= ;.
If BeN > 0 and there is a product j 2 Q for which cj > 0 then we can remove all products j
for which cj =0without changing any of the values vp(S). This holds because each coalition of
producers will restrict its production to the products with a positiveprice.
ThisleadstoBeN > 0and c>0 . If thereexistsa productj 2 Qthatusesnoresources, Ae0
j =0 ,
then the producers can produce an inﬁnite amount of this good, because it needs no input, and sell it
at price cj > 0 to obtainan inﬁnite proﬁt. Hence, vp(N)=1and we may say that the producers are
in heaven since they can take as much of the proﬁt as they want.
Finally, we end up with BeN > 0, c>0and Ae0
j 6=0for all j 2 Q. In this case we use a
theorem of Tijs (1979) that says that we have either vp(N)=v d ( N )=1(heaven once again) or
vp(N)=v d ( N )<1 . In the latter case, OdN 6= ; and consequently Owen(A;B;c) 6= ;,w h i c h
implies that Core(A;B;c) 6= ;.
2
8We may conclude from this theorem that if vp(N) < 1 then there exists a core-allocation, a
division of the value vp(N) upon which no coalition S can improve. If we are in the heavenly
situation vp(N)=1 , then we do not need shadow prices or core-allocations since any producer can
get what he wantsfrom vp(N), even if it is an inﬁnitelylarge amount.
4 Finite LTP situations
Another kind of linear production is described by situations involving the linear transformation of
products(LTP), where the ‘T’ standsfor the transformationof a set of inputgoodsintoa set of output
goods. Thus, each transformation technique may have more than one output good. Recall that each
production process in an LP situation has only one output good, namely its product. Furthermore,
different producers may have different transformation techniques at their disposal, while in an LP
situation all producers use the same set of production techniques. LTP situations are introduced in
Timmer, Borm and Suijs (2000) and deﬁned as follows.
Let M be the ﬁnite set of goods and N the ﬁnite set of producers. Producer i 2 N owns the
bundleof goods !(i) 2 IR M
+ and we assume that all producers together own something of each good,
that is,
P




















if M contains four goods. Positive elements in such a vector a indicate that the corresponding good
is an output of the transformation technique, negative elements indicate input goods and zero means
that the correspondinggood is not used in this technique. In this example, the ﬁrst and third good are
outputs of the transformation process, the fourth good is an input and the second good is not used.
More precisely, 3 units of the fourth good can be transformed into 5 units of the ﬁrst good and 1 unit
of the third good. We assume that each transformation technique uses at least one good to produce
another good, so, it contains at least one positive and one negative element.
Denote by Di the set of transformation techniques of producer i 2 N.T h e n k 2 D imeans
that producer i can use technique ak. The set of all transformation techniques is D = [i2NDi.W e
assume that all producers are price-takers and that all goods can be sold at the exogenous market
prices p 2 IR M
+ nf 0 g . All transformation techniques are linear,s o ,2 a kis also a transformation
technique. The factor 2 is called the activity level of technique k. Denote by y =( y k ) k 2 Dthe
vector of activity levels. Because we cannot reverse any transformation process, all activity levels are
nonnegative. The transformationmatrix A 2 IR M  D is the matrix with transformation technique ak
at column k. Related to this is the matrix G 2 IR M  D
+ that describes which and how many of the
goods are needed as inputs in the various transformation techniques. For all j 2 M and k 2 D we
have Gjk = gk
j =m a x f 0 ;− a k
jg . From this it follows that (ak + gk)j =m a x f a k
j;0 g , so the vector
ak+gk describeswhichandhowmanyofthegoodsareoutputsintechniquek. Thus,whentechnique
9k has activity level yk  0 then the vector gkyk describes the amount of input goods we need and
(ak + gk)yk describes the outputof this transformation technique.
Consider ﬁrst a single producer i 2 N. He should choose his activity vector y such that the
amount of goods he needs does not exceed the amount of goods he owns, Gy  !(i).F u r t h e r m o r e ,
this producer can only use his own transformation techniques. Therefore yk =0if k= 2D i .T h e
amountof outputof the transformationtechniqueswillbe (A+G)y. We see that the producerstarted
with !(i) from which he uses Gy as inputs and he obtains (A + G)y as outputs, so he can sell the
remaining goods, !(i) − Gy +( A+G ) y=!( i )+Ay, on the market. His goal is to maximize his
proﬁt pT(!(i)+Ay) such that the activity vector y is feasible:
maxfpT(!(i)+Ay)jGy  !(i);y0 ;y k=0if k= 2D i g :
Producersarealsoallowedtoworktogether. Whentheycooperatethentheywillpooltheirtechniques
and their bundles of goods. A coalition S  N of producers has the bundle !(S)=
P
i 2 S! ( i )at its
disposalanditcan useallthetransformationtechniquesin D(S)=[ i 2 SD i. Theproﬁtmaximization
problem of such a coalitionis similar to that of a single producer and equals
maxfpT(!(S)+Ay)jGy  !(S);y0 ;y k=0if k= 2D ( S ) g :
When we want to determine the dual problem of this proﬁt-maximization problem then the last
constraint,yk =0if k= 2D ( S ) , gives some trouble because it is not linear. However, we will replace
this constraint by a linear restriction with the same interpretation. For this, deﬁne for all k 2 D and






0 ;k = 2D(S):











y ( S )
y0 :
The (primal) maximization problem PS for coalitionS can thus be rewritten to
PS :m a x f p T ( ! ( S )+Ay)jGy  !(S);y ( S ) ;y0 g :
Because of the vector (S) it is now very easy to determine the dual program DS of PS.
DS :m i n
8
<








G Tz M +z D A Tp;




ThevectorATp 2 IR D denotestheproﬁtsindollarsperactivitylevelforalltransformationtechniques.
ThematrixGisdenotedinunitsofgoodsperactivitylevel. Therefore,thevectorzM 2 IR M isdenoted
in units of dollars per good an the vector zD 2 IR D in dollars per activity level. A nice interpretation
10for the vector zM follows from the complementaryslackness conditions:i f^ y ,^ z Mand ^ zD are optimal
solutionsof the primary and dual programs of coalition S then
0=^ z T
M [ ! ( S ) − G ^ y ] ; (1)
0=^ z T
D [  ( S ) − ^ y ] and (2)
0=^ y T [ G T ^ z M +^ z D−A Tp ] :
Equation (1) is equal to
P
j2M ^ zM;j(!(S)−G^ y)j =0 . This sum of nonnegative elements is zero if
and only if each element equals zero. So, for all goods j 2 M it holds that ^ zM;j(!(S)−G^ y)j =0 .
If ^ zM;j > 0 then !(S)j =( G ^ y ) j: the available amount of good j, is precisely enough to cover the
amount of good j that is needed. From the objective function of the dual program DS it follows
that an extra unit of good j will raise the proﬁt by ^ zM because duality theory says that the optimal
values of PS and DS are equal. If, on the other hand, the amount of good j available is too large,
!(S)j > (G^ y)j,t h e n^ z M;j =0 : an extra unit of good j will not raise the proﬁt. We can therefore
think of ^ zM as the vector of prices that the coalition S of producers is willing to pay for an extra
unit of the goods. We will call the vector ^ zM + p the vector of shadow prices for the goods of this
coalition. The followingtheorem shows a nice result that follows from (2).
Theorem 4.1 The equality ^ zT
D(S)=0holdsfor all optimal solutions(^ zM;^ zD)of DS.
Proof. Because the set of feasible solutions of DS is closed, convex, nonempty and bounded from
below by the zero-vector, the program DS can be solved and a minimum exists. Let (^ zM;^ zD) be
an optimal solution. By the complementary slackness conditions equation (2) holds and is equal to
P
k2D ^ zD;k((S) − ^ y)k =0 . Again, this is a sum of nonnegative elements, so it should hold that
^ zD;k((S)− ^ y)k =0for all transformation techniques k 2 D.I f^ z D;k > 0 then (S)k =^ y k .T h e
deﬁnition of (S) implies that in this case (S)k =0 ,s ok= 2D ( S ) .I f  ( S ) k>^ y k ,w h i c hi s
equivalent to k 2 D(S),t h e n^ z D;k =0 . We conclude that ^ zD;k(S)k =0for all transformation
techniquesk 2 D.
2
For easeof notationlet FpS and FdS denotethesetsoffeasiblesolutionsofrespectivelytheprimal
and the dual program for coalitionS,
FpS = fy 2 IR D j Gy  !(S);y ( S ) ;y0 g
F dS = f(zM;z D)2IR M  IR D j G T z M + z D  A T p; zM  0;z D0g;
denote by upS and udS the optimal values of the programs,
upS =m a x f p T ( ! ( S )+Ay)jy 2 FpSg
udS =m i n f ( z M + p ) T ! ( S )+zT
D(S)j(z M;z D)2F dSg;
and let OpS and OdS be the sets of optimal solutions,
OpS = fy 2 FpSjpT(!(S)+Ay)=u pSg
OdS = f(zM;z D)2F dSj(zM + p)T!(S)+z T
D(S)=u dSg:
11The sets FpS, FdS, OpS and OdS are nonempty and the values upS and udS exist and are ﬁnite. By
dualitytheory it holds that upS = udS for any coalition S of producers.
An LTP situation will be described by the tuple (N;A;D;!;p)where ! =( ! ( i ))i2N. Corre-
spondingtoanLTPsituationwedeﬁnetwocooperativegames. Theﬁrstone,(N;vp),istheL TPgame
as deﬁned in Timmer, Borm and Suijs (2000)where vp(S)=u pS, the maximal proﬁt thatcoalition S
can obtain. The second one is the dual game (N;vd)that gives each coalition S the value of its dual
program, vd(S)=u dS.
ThecoreofanLTPsituation,Core(A;!;p),isdeﬁnedasthecoreofanLTPgame, Core(A;!;p)=
C( v p) . Furthermore, we know that for all (zM;z D)2O dN
vp(N)=v d( N)=( z M+p ) T! ( N)+z T
D(N)=( z M+p ) T! ( N) ;
where the last equality followsfrom theorem 4.1. Timmer, Borm and Suijs (2000) show that ((zM +
p)T!(i))i2N 2 C(vp). Thus it follows from OdN 6= ; that LTP games are totally balanced: each
LTPgame has a nonempty core and because each subgame is another LTPgame, these subgames also
have a nonempty core. Although G. Owen did not show that you can ﬁnd a core-element of an LTP
game via the dual program DN, we let Owen(A;!;p) denote the set of all core-elements that we can
ﬁnd in this way:
Owen(A;!;p)=f ((zM + p)T!(i))i2Nj(zM;z D)2O dNg:
FromOdN 6= ;italsofollowsthatOwen(A;!;p) 6= ;andbydeﬁnitionitholdsthatOwen(A;!;p) 
Core(A;!;p).
The following example of an LTP situation with its two corresponding games illustrates the
concepts introduced in this section.
Example 4.2 ConsiderthefollowingLTPsituation. Thereare twoproducers, N = f1;2g,theywork

















The ﬁrst column of A contains the technique of producer 1 and the second column contains the
technique of the other producer, so, Di = fig, i 2 N. When each of the producers works on her
own then she will transform her single unit of the ﬁrst good into respectively 2 and 3 units of the
second good. This producer already owns a unit of the second good and therefore vp(f1g)=3and
vp(f2g)=4 .
When the producers cooperate then they own !(N)=( 2 ;2)T and their set of feasible activity
vectors is
FpN = fy 2 IR 2 j y 1 + y 2  2 ;y0 g :
Producer 2 has a more efﬁcient transformation techniquethan producer 1 becauseit generates a larger
proﬁt from the same amount of input, namely 2 dollars per activity level against 1 dollar per activity
level for producer 1.
PN :m a x f 4+y 1+2 y 2jy2F pNg
12The maximal proﬁt upN =8is attained in y =( 0 ; 2)T,s oO pN = f(0;2)Tg. The core equals
Core(A;!;p)=f ( b;8− b)j3  b  4g.
Forthedualgame(N;vd)itholdsthatvd(f1g)=3andvd(f2g)=3 . Thesetoffeasiblesolutions
of DN is
FdN = f(zM;z D)2IR 2
+  IR 2
+j z M;1+zD;1  1;z M;1 +zD;2  2g:
When we solve the program DN
minf4+2 z M;1 +2 z M;2 +1(zD;1 +zD;2)j(zM;z D)2F dNg
then we get OdN = f((2;0);(0;0))g and udN =8=u pN. Thus the Owen set consists of only one
point, Owen(A;!;p)=f (4;4)gand is contained in Core(A;!;p).
3
5 Semi-inﬁnite LTP situations
In thissectionwe willstudysemi-inﬁniteLTP situationswhere the set D containsa countableinﬁnite
number of transformation techniques. Without loss of generality we assume that D = f1;2;3;::: g.
Asemi-inﬁnite LTP situation (N;A;D;!;p)thus has A 2 IR M  D , ! ( i ) 2 IR M
+ for all i 2 N and
p 2 IR M
+ . As opposed to the previous section, we do not put any futher restrictionson A, ! and p.
Becauseoftheinﬁnitenumberoftransformationtechniques,thelinearprogramsthatdeterminethe
maximalproﬁtsofthecoalitionsandtheirdualprogramsare semi-inﬁnitelinearprograms. Therefore,
we will replace the maximum by the supremum in the deﬁnitions of PS and upS and the minimum
willbe replaced by the inﬁmum in the deﬁnitionsof DS and udS. Asopposedto ﬁniteLTP situations,
the set of feasible dual solutions FdS may now be empty and the same holds for the sets of optimal
solutions OpS and OdS. The two games (N;vp) and (N;vd) are deﬁned as before, so, vp(S)=u pS
for the LTP game and vd(S)=u dS for the dual game. In this semi-inﬁnite situation the values upS
and udS can take any nonnegative value as well as +1.
The Owen set, as deﬁned in the previous section, is based on the dual program for the grand
coalition:
DN :i n f
8
<







G Tz M+z D A Tp;




In our deﬁnition of the Owen set we use that for ﬁnite LTP situations it holds that zT
D(N)=0
for any optimal solution (zM;z D)of DN. But this property need not hold for semi-inﬁnite LTP
situations. When udN = 1 then an optimal solution (zM;z D)(if it exists) has zT
D(N)=1but
when udN < 1 then zT
D(N)=0 . For this reason we will deﬁne the Owen set only if udN < 1:
Owen(A;!;p)=f ((zM + p)T!(i))i2Nj(zM;z D)2O dNg:
The next theorem states some nice properties of the LTP and dual games.
Theorem 5.1 Let (N;A;D;!;p)be a semi-inﬁniteLTP situation. Then
131. FdS = FdN for all S  N,
2. vp and vd are monotonicgames,
3. vp(S)  vd(S) for all S  N.
Proof. First, by deﬁnition FdS = f(zM;z D)2IR M
+  IR D
+ j G T z M + z D  A T p g = F dN for all
S  N.
Second, let S  T  N,t h e n! ( S )! ( T)and (S)  (T).S o , F pS = fy 2 IR D j Gy 
!(S);y ( S ) ;y0 gF pT and therefore vp(S) = supfpT(!(S)+Ay)jy 2 FpSgv p( T) .
From the ﬁrst part of this proof it follows that FdS = FdT and together with !(S)  !(T) and
(S)  (T) thisimplies that vd(S)=i n ff ( z M+p ) T! ( S)+zT
D(S)j(z M;z D)2F dSgv d( T) .
Third, let S be a coalition of producers. If FdS = ; then vp(S) 1=v d( S ) . Otherwise, take
feasible solutions y 2 FpS and (zM;z D) 2 F dS.T h e n p T ( ! ( S )+Ay)=p T! ( S )+y TA Tp





p ) T! ( S)+z T
D ( S )and from this it follows that vp(S) = supfpT(!(S)+Ay)jy 2 FpSg
inff(zM + p)T!(S)+zT
D(S)j(z M;z D)2F dSg = vd(S).
2
Some relations between the Owen set and the cores of the LTP and dual games are stated below.
Theorem 5.2 Let (N;A;D;!;p)be a semi-inﬁnite LTP situation. Then the following two relations
hold.
1. If vd(N) < 1 then Owen(A;!;p)  C(vd).
2. If vp(N)=v d( N)then C(vd)  C(vp).
Proof. Firstly, if Owen(A;!;p)=;then the result holds. Otherwise, let x 2 Owen(A;!;p).T h e n
there exists a solution (z0
M;z0
D)2O dN such that xi =( z 0





M + p)T!(i)=( z 0
M+p ) T! ( N)=( z 0
M+p ) T! ( N)+(z 0
D) T(N)=v d( N) ,
where (z0
D)T(N)=0because vd(N) < 1. Second, (z0
D)T(N)=0implies (z0
D)T(S)=0
because (N)  (S).A l s o ,( z 0
M;z0
D)2O dN  FdN = FdS, where the last equality follows from
statement 1 of theorem 5.1. Thus,
P
i2S xi =( z 0
M+p ) T! ( S )=( z 0
M+p ) T! ( S )+( z 0
D) T( S)
inff(zM + p)T!(S)+zT
D(S)j(z M;z D)2F dSg = vd(S). Hence, x 2 C(vd).
Secondly, if C(vd)=;then we are done. Otherwise, take an element x 2 C(vd). By deﬁnition
it holdsthat
P
i2N xi = vd(N)=v p( N) .F u r t h e r m o r e ,
P
i 2 Sx iv d( S )v p ( S )by statement 3 in
theorem 5.1. We conclude that x 2 C(vp).
2
Aconsequenceofthistheoremisthatifvp(N)=v d( N)<1thenOwen(A;!;p)  Core(A;!;p).
We can now have Owen(A;!;p)=;even if vp(N)=v d( N) , as the followingexample shows.
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G Tz M +z D A Tp;
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where FdN 6= ;,b u tO dN = ; a n dt h i si m p l i e st h a tO w e n ( A;!;p)=; . There is no duality gap in
this example because vp(N)=5=v d( N) .
3
In case of a duality gap, vp(N) <v d ( N ) , another relation between the Owen set and the core
exists.
Theorem 5.4 Let (N;A;!;p)be a semi-inﬁnite LTP situation where vp(N) <v d ( N )<1 .T h e n
Owen(A;!;p)\ Core(A;!;p)=; .
Proof. The proof of this theorem goes analogousto the proof of the ﬁrst part in theorem 3.4.
2
Finally, we obtain the same result as for semi-inﬁnite LP, namely, that if vp(N) is ﬁnite in a
semi-inﬁnite LTP situation then the core is nonempty. For this, we need two intermediate theorems.
The ﬁrst one is a theorem by Karlin and Studden (1966), which we translated to semi-inﬁnite LTP
situations.
Theorem 5.5 Suppose that vp(N) is ﬁnite and that !j(N) > 0 for all j 2 M. Then there is no
dualitygap, vp(N)=v d( N) , and the dual programDN has an optimalsolution.
The second intermediate theorem shows that we have no duality gap, vp(N)=v d ( N ) ,a n d
C ( v p )6 =;if certain conditionshold.
Theorem 5.6 If !(N) 2 IR M
+ nf 0 g ,p2IR M
+ nf 0 g ,! j( N)=0)g k
j =0for all k 2 D, pTak > 0
for all k 2 D, ak = 2 IR M
+ for all k 2 D and vp(N) < 1,t h e nv p ( N )=v d ( N ) ,O dN 6= ; and
C(vp) 6= ;.
15Proof. If!j(N) > 0forallj 2 M thentogetherwithvp(N) < 1andtheorem5.5itfollowsthatthere
is no duality gap and there exists an optimal dual solution ^ z.D e ﬁ n ex2IR N by xi =( ^ z+p )
T! ( i )
for all i 2 N. We leave it to the reader to show that x 2 C(vp).
If we have !j(N)=0for some j 2 M then deﬁne M0 = fj 2 M j !j(N)=0gand M+ =
fj 2 M j !j(N) > 0g.T h e nM 06 =;and M+ 6= ;. Now the primal problem can be rewritten to



















and similarly, we obtain for the dual problem















jz j p Ta k;k2D;




where we observe that the assumptions imply that for all k 2 D there exists a j 2 M+ such that
gk
j > 0. Thus, the latter problem is feasible. Let ej denote the jth unit vector in I RM+, with e
j
l =1if
l = j and e
j


















where the last equality follows from gk
j  0 for all j 2 M+, k 2 D.B u tt h e n
f ! j( N ) g j 2 M +2int(K1)=IR
M +
++;
where int(K1) denotes the interior of the cone K1, because !j(N) > 0 for all j 2 M+. Together
with vp(N) < 1 and theorem 5.5 it follows once again that vp(N)=v d ( N )and there exists an
optimal dual solution ^ z. To obtain an element of the core C(v),w ed e ﬁ n ez j =^ z jfor all j 2 M+
and zj =0otherwise. Also, deﬁne x 2 IR N by xi =( z+p )











j 2 M +
^ z j! j( N)+p T!(N)=v d( N)=v p( N) :
Second, letS  N,S 6= ;, be acoalitionofplayers. Noticethat !j(N)=0forsomej 2 M0 implies
that !j(S)=0for all S  N because !(S)=
P
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jz j p Ta k;k2D;























 p T! ( S ) + sup
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i2S xi =( z+p )
T! ( S )v p( S )and hence, x 2 C(vp).
2
With the help of these two theorems we prove our main result about semi-inﬁnite LTP situations,
which states that if there exists a ﬁnite upper bound for the maximal proﬁt that all producers together
can obtain then the core of the LTP game is nonempty.
Theorem 5.7 Let (N;A;!;p)be a semi-inﬁnite LTP situationand let (N;vp) be the corresponding
LTP game with vp(N) < 1.T h e nC ( v p )6 =; .
Proof. In thisproof, we considerone-by-oneallthe possiblesemi-inﬁniteLTP situationsthatwe may
come across. In each of these situationswe show that either vp(N)=1or C(vp) 6= ;.
First, suppose that !(N)=0 . This implies that !(S)=0for all coalitions S. No coalition
of producers can transform any goods or sell any on the market. Hence, vp(S)=0for all S and
C(vp)=f (0;:::;0)g.
Second, consider the situation where !(N) 6=0but every transformation technique k needs a
good j for which !j(N)=0 .L e t h ( t ) describe for all bundles of goods t 2 IR M
+ those goods
that are available in a positive quantity, so, h(t)=f j2Mjt j>0 g .T h e n h ( ! ( N )) 6 h(gk) for
all k 2 D means that each technique k needs some unavailable goods. Consequently, no coalition
S can transform any goods. The only thing it can do is sell its goods at the market and obtain
vp(S)=p T! ( S ) .F r o m ! ( S )=
P
i 2 S! ( i )we derive that the core consists of a single element,
C(vp)=f ( p T! (1);:::;p T!(n))g,w h e r eN=f 1 ;2 ;:::;ng.
Assume now that !(N) 6=0and that some transformation techniques can be used because they
only need goods that are available, h(!(N))  h(gk) for some k 2 D. All the coalitions of
producers want to maximize their proﬁt and therefore they will restrict their transformation to those
techniques that can be used. Therefore, without changing the values of the coalitions we remove all
the transformation techniques k for which h(!(N)) 6 h(gk).I ft h i sr e m o v a li m p l i e st h a tD( S)=;
for some coalition S then deﬁne vp(U)=p T! ( U)for all U  S. For convenience, let (N;A;!;p)
also denote this reduced semi-inﬁnite LTP situation.
This leads us to the next situation where !(N) 6=0 ,h ( ! ( N ))  h(gk) for all k 2 D,a n da l s o
p=0 . If all the goods have a price of zero then vp(S)=0for all coalitions S and consequently,
C(vp)=f (0;:::;0)g.
If !(N) 6=0 ,h ( ! ( N ))  h(gk) for all k 2 D, p 6=0and pTak  0 for all k 2 D then
no transformation technique gives a positive proﬁt. For all optimal solutions y 2 OpS it holds
that pTakyk =0for all techniques k. Hence, vp(S)=p T! ( S )for all coalitions S and C(vp)=
f ( p T! (1);:::;p T!(n))g.
Now assume that !(N) 6=0 ,h ( ! ( N ))  h(gk) for all k 2 D, p 6=0and pTak > 0 for some
k 2 D. In the previous situation we have seen that if pTak  0 then in the optimum pTakyk =0 .
Thistechniquek willnothave any inﬂuence on theproﬁt and so, removal of these techniqueswillnot
change the values of the coalitions. Also in this case, we deﬁne vp(U)=p T! ( U )for all U  S if
the removal implies that D(S)=; .
17In the next situation, we consider !(N) 6=0 ,h ( ! ( N))  h(gk) for all k 2 D, p 6=0 ,p Ta k>0
forall k 2 D and ak 2 IR M
+ forsomek 2 D. Noticethatforthistechniquek we haveak 2 IR M
+ nf0g,
because ak =0implies pTak =0 , which is in contradiction to pTak > 0.I fa k2IR M
+ then gk =0 ,
whichmeansthattechniquekneedsnoinputgoodstogeneratethepositiveproﬁtpTak. Consequently,
the coalition N of all players will set the activity level yk to inﬁnity and so, vp(N)=1 . The total
proﬁt is inﬁnitelylarge. We may say that we are in heaven because all the producers can takeas much
of the proﬁt as they want.
Finally, we consider !(N) 6=0 ,h ( ! ( N))  h(gk) for all k 2 D, p 6=0 ,p Ta k>0for all k 2 D
and ak = 2 IR M
+ for all k 2 D. Notice that pTak > 0 implies that ak = 2 IR M
− for all k 2 D. Together
with ak = 2 IR M
+ we get that each vector ak contains at least one positive and one negative element.
Eachtransformationtechniqueneedsatleast oneinputgoodtoproduceatleastoneoutputgood. Now,
two situationsmay occur. Either we have vp(N)=v d( N)=1 , heaven once again, or vp(N) < 1.
In the latter case, theorem 5.6 shows that the core is a nonempty set.
2
6 Conclusions
We studied the Owen set, the core and relations between these two sets of two types of semi-inﬁnite
situations. These are situations involving linear production (LP) and those involving the linear
transformation of products (LTP). We showed that if the underlying primal and dual problems of the
grand coalition of players have the same value, that is, there is no duality gap, then the Owen set is a
(possiblyempty) subset of the core. Otherwise, the Owen set and the core have nothing in common.
In the case of LTP situations we had to exclude situations where the underlying dual problem takes
the value inﬁnite. Finally, we showed that if there exists a ﬁnite upper bound of the maximal proﬁt
then the core is a nonempty set.
Aftercompletingthisstudy,somequestionsremain. Throughoutthepaperweuseconesconsisting
of real numbers like I RN and I RM
+ . What would happen if we replace these cones by more general
cones? Howdotheresultschangeifwe consideran inﬁnitenumberof producers(implyingan inﬁnite
number of productiontechniques)? Andﬁnally, what happensif we assume that the set of production
techniquesis no longer countable? We intend to study these questionsin the near future.
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